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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ZONING ORDINANCE
The Mayor of the Village of Ottawa rejected the defendant's appli-
cation for a permit to build a grain loading elevator on property adjacent
to a railroad crossing. On the same day the village council passed an
emergency zoning ordinance prohibiting certain types of business struc-
tures, among them grain elevators, in a prescribed area of the village
comprising one-tenth to one-fifteenth of the total area and including the
defendant's property. In an action by the Village of Ottawa to enjoin
the erection of the elevator, the Common Pleas Court of Putnam
County entered a decree for the plaintiff, subject to the securing of a
permit by the defendant. The Court of Appeals of Putnam County
held the ordinance unreasonable and discriminatory, resulting in a depri-
vation of property without due process of law and a denial of the equal
protection of the laws. Following compliance with certain procedural
omissions, the defendant was held entitled to an injunction to secure the
permit as prayed for in its cross-petition. Village of Ottawa v. The
Odenweller Milling Co., 57 Ohio App. 170, 20 Ohio L. Abs. 664,
5 Ohio 0. 154 (1936).
From the viewpoint of extensive efforts to control and eliminate
traffic hazards the case presents an interesting problem.
A zoning ordinance is in derogation of the common law right to
use of private property, enacted in the exercise of municipal police power.
The courts in the beginning were reluctant to concede the existence of
the power but, since recognition by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Euclid v. 4mbler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114,
71 L. Ed. 303, 54 A.L.R. ioi6 (1926), the scope of the power has
been greatly extended. Ohio municipalities have two alternatives, deriv-
ing their power from Art. 18, Sec. 3 of the Ohio Constitution and
Ohio G.C. sec. 4366-I to 4366-i9. Regulation of bulk, area, and use
of buildings is upheld under the former, while the latter prescribes statu-
tory methods for the creation of planning commissions. Apparently the
statutory method is not exclusive, and the exercise of local police power
is not in conflict with general state laws. In the principal case there was
no effort to comply with the provisions of the statute, and the court felt
the ordinance was not justified as a valid exercise of the police power
under the Constitution.
It is a fundamental rule that rights of private property cannot be
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taken away or interfered with without due process of law. The right to
use private property is, however, subservient to the general welfare, and
before a court will declare a zoning ordinance invalid, it must dearly
appear that it bears no substantial relation to public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare. Thus the power to zone must not be exercised in
an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unjustifiable manner, and the ordinance
must have a reasonable and substantial relation to its purpose. Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., supra; Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48
S. Ct. 447, 72 L. Ed. 842 (1928).
Municipalities have a broad field in the application of these powers,
including regulation of the height of buildings, percentage of lot occu-
pancy, set back or building lines, and nuisances, in addition to the plans
relative to manufacturing, business, and residential districts. Typical
Ohio cases are Harris v. State ex rel., 23 Ohio App. 33, 155 N.E. 166
(1926); State ex rel. v. Rendigs, 98 Ohio St. 251, 12o N.E. 836
(1918); and State ex rel. v. Cunningham, 97 Ohio St. 130, 119 N.E.
361 (1917). In the principal case, the regulation extended to prohibi-
tion and the prohibited buildings were not nuisances per se. A legislative
declaration cannot make an ordinary business a nuisance, although it
may by regulation prevent its becoming such, and the business may be-
come one by its location in a certain zoned district. Smith v. Collison,
1i9 Cal. App. i8o, 6 Pac. (2d) 277 (1931); Spann v. Dallas, iii
Tex. 350, 235 S.,. 513, 19 A.L.R. 1387 (1921); Wolarz v. Cuya-
hoga Heights, 5 Ohio App. 16l, 4 N.E. (2d) 400, 21 Ohio L. Abs.
497, 5 Ohio 0. 422 (1936).
Advancing from building regulations into the broader field of zon-
ing, the first requirement seems to be a reasonable classification of
zoning districts. Ohio is in accord with a majority of jurisdictions in
requiring a general, comprehensive plan, and in looking with disfavor
on so-called "block ordinances" relating to only a small district of a
municipality. Pritz v. Mlesser, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925);
Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E.
842, 43 A.L.R. 662 (1925). Some jurisdictions apparently find no
objection to ordinances segregating a lot, single block, or small area.
State ex rel. v. Miami, 117 Fla. 594, 158 So. 82 (1934); Harris v.
Piedmont, 5 Cal. App. (2d) 146, 42 Pac. (2d) 356 (1935). But
throughout the cases we find a requirement of reasonable classification
and restrictions within the zoned district, allowing the same rights of
using property similarly situated. Koch v. Toledo, 37 Fed. (2d) 336
(1930); Reynolds v. Barrett, -Cal.-, 68 Pac. (2d) 266 (937);
People ex rel. v. Rockford, 363 Ill. 531, 2 N.E. (2d) 842 (1936);
354 LAW JOURNAL-JUNE, 1938
Gabrielson v. Glen Ridge, 13 N. J. Misc. R. 142, 176 Ad. 676
(1935); Whites Alppeal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 Adt. 409, 53 A.L.R.
1215 (1926); State of Washington ex rel. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. I16,
49 S. Ct. 50, 73 L. Ed. 210, 86 A.L.R. 659 (1928); Strain v.
Mirs, 123 Conn. 275, 193 Adt. 754 (937); Bay v. Borchers, 15
Ohio L. Abs. 226 (1933); Mahoning Express Company v. Youngs-
town, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 745 (I933); Smith v. Troy, 18 Ohio L. Abs.
476 (I934); Cincinnati v. Struble, 30 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 380 (1933).
In the principal case, the court concluded there was neither a general
plan nor a reasonable classification. The zoned district is almost entirely
devoted to business and commercial purposes. Other elevators located
therein are as proximate to residential areas as that the defendant pro-
posed to erect. Since all whose property is in substantially the same
position were not treated alike, the ordinance was held unreasonable
and confiscatory. See: Tews v. Woolhiser, 352 Ill. 212, 185 N.E. 827
(1933); State ex rel. v. Jacksonville, IOI Fla. 1241, 133 So. 114
(931). Although a proper exercise of the police power can materially
restrict or destroy property rights, the court indicated that the proper
way to reach the desired result was by condemnation and compensation
under Art. i, Sec. 19 of the Ohio Constitution. Ohio courts have pre-
viously held that the prohibition of a business not a nuisance per se from
a commercial district cannot be accomplished under the guise of the
police power, but that provision must be made for appropriation or
payment of damages sustained. Lucas v. State ex rel., 21 Ohio L. R.
363 (1923); Wolarz v. Cuyahoga Heights, supra.
The principal contention of the Village of Ottawa rested upon an
anticipated obstruction of view at a railroad crossing adjacent to the
proposed elevator site. It may seem surprising that such a commendable
purpose cannot be justified in view of the extent to which regulation
has gone in restricting and partially depriving owners of the use of their
property. Regulation of areaways, set backs, residential districts, and
billboards effectively deprives an owner of at least part of his property
right. Although purportedly based on health, safety, morals, and general
welfare, even aesthetic values have in many cases furnished a primary
basis. Despite expressions of the courts to the contrary, the presence of
a serious public need or justification often seems questionable, however
desirable the result. Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526,
37 S. Ct. 19o, 61 L.Ed. 472 (1917); Gen. Outdoor Adv. Co. v.
Dept. of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935);
Thille v. Bd. of Public Works of Los Angeles, 82 Cal. App. 187, 255
Pac. 294 (1927); Weiss v. Guion, 17 Fed. (2d) 202 (1926); dyer
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v. Cram, 242 Mass. 30, 136 N.E. 338 (1923); West Bros. Brick Co.
v. Alexandria, -Va.--, 192 S.E. 881 (1937).
The defendant might be limited to a less profitable use of his prop-
erty if the ordinance here were upheld. A considerable decrease in the
value of property has seemingly not troubled the courts, although it is
indicated as a factor to be considered. Geneva Inv. Co. v. St. Louis,
87 Fed. (2d) 83 (1937); Gabrielson v. Glen Ridge, supra; Smith v.
Collison, supra. There are limitations, however. Isenbarth v. Bartnett,
201 N. Y. Supp. 383, 2o6 App. Div. 546 (1923). Zoning regulations
have been carried to the point of preventing the exploitation of natural
resources on the owner's land. West Bros. Brick Go. v. Alexandria,
supra. However, the courts generally show a tendency to protect prop-
erty of such peculiar value. Terrace Park v. Erret, 12 Fed. (2d) 240
(1926).
The safety basis was insuflicient to convince the court in the
principal case. It becomes less forceful when we notice that only grain
elevators, grain storage houses, flour mills, public automobile garages,
coal sheds, and stone sheds were prohibited, thus allowing other types
of buildings which would obstruct the view of motorists, although possibly
not as completely as a grain elevator. And if carried to its logical con-
clusion, the safety argument would preclude or seriously restrict almost
any profitable use of the land in question. There is authority supporting
the view that an attempt to save the lives of motorists at railroad cross-
ings and intersections will not justify zoning regulations for corner lots
and land contiguous to a railroad crossing. Henderson v. Greenwood,
172 S. C. 16, 172 S.E. 689 (934); Eaton v. South Orange, 3 N. J.
Misc. R. 956, 13o Ad. 362 (1925); Tenez Const. Corp. v. Garner,
4 N. J. Misc. R. 488, 133 Atl. 396 (1926). The courts observe that
a motorist has the duty of using due care when he approaches a crossing
or intersection.
If the problem is really acute, the municipality has other approaches
by compelling elimination of the crossing or the maintenance of adequate
signals, warnings, watchmen, or gates. The use of eminent domain will
be a solution if the public need is sufficient to warrant its exercise, and
the stumbling block of confiscation under the police power thereby
averted. It seems we could reasonably argue, however, that the zoning
ordinance is non-discriminatory and general enough, if it could be shown
only one such dangerous obstruction exists, or if it applied uniformly to
all crossings in the municipality. Or, not going so far, it seems plausible
that some regulation, in the nature of set backs, for example, rather than
prohibition, could be justified for the purpose of lessening the danger.
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The court further pointed out, consistently with earlier Ohio de-
cisions, that the ordinance was invalid as a stop-gap ordinance to pre-
serve the status quo pending the adoption of a comprehensive zoning
ordinance. State ex rel. v. Guion, 117 Ohio St. 327, 158 N.E. 748
(1927); State ex rel. v. Kruezweiser, 12o Ohio St. 352, 166 N.E.
228 (1929). A number of jurisdictions look more favorably upon such
emergency measures. Downham v. City Council of Aexandria, 58 Fed.
(2d) 784 (1932); Lima v. Woodruff, 107 Cal. App. 285, 290 Pac.
480 (1930).
The crux of the whole problem is the extent to which regulation
under the police power can be carried before it ceases to be regulation
and reaches the point of confiscation without compensation. It is essen-
tially a question of degree and a balancing of public and private interests.
While it may at first seem startling that such a hazard to life cannot be
removed in the manner attempted, the case is sound from the viewpoint
of precedent.
Jo-N G. SARBER
CRIMINAL LAW
EXTRADITION - INSANITY AS A BAR TO
The Ohio Legislature, during its last session, adopted the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act (Ohio G.C. sec. 109-1 to 109-31) which
became effective August 20, 1937. The first case decided under the
new Act involved a request by the State of Georgia for the return of an
alleged fugitive who had committed arson in that state and fled from
justice, seeking asylum in Ohio. At the hearing before the Governor,
the request for extradition was honored, and a warrant issued for the
rendition of the alleged fugitive. A writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
the accused issued out of the court of common pleas, and at the hearing
of the cause it was shown that a lunacy inquest concerning his mental
capacity was then pending. The court found that it was improper to
proceed with the extradition so long as the lunacy proceedings existed.
A writ of procedendo on the relation of the Governor then issued in
the Supreme Court compelling the court of common pleas to proceed
to judgment in the habeas corpus proceedings notwithstanding the
pendency of the lunacy inquest. The State, ex rel., Davey, Governor,
et al. v. Owen, Judge, et al., 133 Ohio St. 96, 1o Ohio 0. 102, 12
N.E. (2d) 144 (1937). This raises the interesting question, "Suppose
the alleged fugitive were so insane as to be unable to understand the
